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Abstract
Banks have a private motive to hold some level of cash and liquid reserves, but the negative
externalities of bank runs create a public interest in setting a regulatory level higher than the
privately optimal level. We can think of such reserve requirements (RRs) as the original form
of liquidity regulation. In this paper, we focus on 14 cases in which central banks adjusted
RRs after crises hit, typically to deal with liquidity shortages in the banking system. We
observe that RR adjustments have several advantages in a crisis: (1) such changes require
little process, and the change for banks can be quick; (2) stigma concerns may be much lower
than with emergency lending operations; (3) RRs can be used to fine-tune incentives for
holding various types and maturities of assets; and (4) RR easing can complement a central
bank’s other liquidity support programs.
Keywords: financial crisis intervention, liquidity, liquidity regulation, reserve requirement
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Introductory Note: This survey is an analysis of important considerations for policymakers
seeking to adjust reserve requirements in response to a financial crisis. It is based on insights
derived from case studies of 14 specific reserve requirement programs the Yale Program on
Financial Stability has completed and from the existing literature on the topic. While this
survey can help inform a decision about whether or not to adjust reserve requirements, our
main purpose is to assist policymakers who have already made that decision in designing
the most effective program possible. In analyzing the programs that are the focus of this
survey, we used a color-coded system to highlight certain particularly noteworthy design
features.
Treatment
BLUE – INTERESTING

YELLOW – CAUTION INDICATED

Meaning
A design feature that is interesting and that
policymakers may want to consider. Typically,
this determination is based on the observation
that the design feature involves a unique and
potentially promising way of addressing a
challenge common to this type of program that
may not be obvious. Less commonly, empirical
evidence or a consensus will indicate that the
design feature was effective in this context, in
which case we will describe that evidence or
consensus.
A design feature that policymakers should
exercise caution in considering. Typically, this
determination is based on the observation that
the designers of the feature later made
significant changes to the feature with the
intention of improving the program. Less
commonly, empirical evidence or a consensus
will indicate that the design feature was
ineffective in this context, in which case we will
describe that evidence or consensus.

This highlighting is not intended to be dispositive. The fact that a design feature is not
highlighted or is highlighted yellow does not mean that it should not be considered or that it
will never be effective under any circumstances. Similarly, the fact that a design feature is
not highlighted or is highlighted blue does not mean that it should always be considered or
will be effective under all circumstances. The highlighting is our subjective attempt to guide
readers toward certain design features that (1) may not be obvious but are worth
considering or (2) require caution.
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Introduction
All banks have a private motive to hold some cash reserves, but the negative externalities of
bank runs create a public interest in setting a regulatory ratio higher than the privately
optimal level. We can think of such reserve requirements (RRs) as the original form of
liquidity regulation, the practice of which has evolved from the simple ratios of the old days
to the complex calculations underlying the rules of Basel III.
This paper surveys 14 cases covering the adjustment of RRs in response to a financial crisis.
RR adjustments have several advantages in a crisis. Perhaps the most important advantage
is speed. For the central bank, adjusting RRs requires little more than a press release; and
the result for banks is automatic—they immediately have access to a potentially significant
amount of liquidity that had previously been restricted or stuck at the central bank. Second,
stigma concerns may be much lower than with emergency lending operations because RR
adjustments typically apply to many or all banks at the same time in the same way. Third,
the authorities can fine-tune incentives for financial institutions by adjusting and
differentiating elements of RRs. Fourth, RR easing can complement a central bank’s other
liquidity support programs.
The main drawback to the use of RRs is that they are relatively weak compared to other crisis
interventions. Nobody should expect that a change in RRs will fix a crisis by itself: compared
to “direct” injections of liquidity or capital, changes in RR ratios are “indirect,” as they require
active bank participation. Nevertheless, in combination with other interventions, RR
adjustments can be a force multiplier in crisis response. Their usage in recent years,
alongside the innovation of more complex liquidity rules, suggests central banks continue to
see RRs as a valuable crisis-fighting tool.
Figure 1 shows all the cases covered in this survey. We use country names and a date or crisis
acronym to refer to the cases in the text.
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Figure 1: Programs Covered in This Survey
Case title

Reference

Argentina: Reserve Requirements, 1994–1995 Leonard 2022
Brazil: Reserve Requirements, GFC

Fulmer 2022

China: Reserve Requirements, GFC

Mott 2022a

China: Reserve Requirements, 2015–2016

Mott 2022b

Colombia: Reserve Requirements, GFC

Leonard and Decker 2022

Czech Republic: Reserve Requirements, 1997

Hoffner 2022a

India: Reserve Requirements, GFC

Nunn and Mott 2022

Jamaica: Reserve Requirements, GFC

Runkel 2022a

Malaysia: Reserve Requirements, AFC

Decker 2022

Peru: Reserve Requirements, GFC

Fulmer and Decker 2022

Russia: Reserve Requirements, 1998

Hoffner 2022b

Russia: Reserve Requirements, GFC

Hoffner 2022c

Thailand: Reserve Requirements, AFC

Runkel and Vergara 2022

Venezuela: Reserve Requirements, GFC

Runkel 2022b

Sources: Decker 2022; Fulmer 2022; Fulmer and Decker 2022; Hoffner 2022a; Hoffner 2022b; Hoffner 2022c;
Leonard 2022; Leonard and Decker 2022; Mott 2022a; Mott 2022b; Nunn and Mott 2022; Runkel 2022a; Runkel
2022b; Runkel and Vergara 2022.

Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: What was the purpose of adjusting RRs?
Outside financial crises, central banks use RRs for several purposes, most often to “lean
against the wind” and promote financial stability during credit expansions. In many cases in
this survey, the reversal of such tightening was an early response to an acute crisis. For
example, before the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (GFC), Colombia and India used
RRs to curtail excessive credit growth but then reversed course to release liquidity tied up
at the central bank. Similarly, in the mid-1990s, the central bank of Russia managed RR policy
to support its primary objective of supporting ruble stability; when the Ruble Crisis hit in
1998, it lowered RRs to provide liquidity to domestic banks and restore the functioning of
the payment system (CBR 1998; 1999, 6–7). Later, in the early 2000s, Russia’s central bank
used RRs to limit domestic banks’ exposure to foreign borrowings and to maintain banking
sector stability; when the GFC erupted, the central bank lowered RRs so the banks could use
funds released from reserves to maintain liquidity and settle payments. The central bank of
Peru used RRs to lengthen the maturity of banks’ liabilities because short-term liabilities are
typically more vulnerable to runs or sudden capital outflows. It responded to a surge of
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capital inflows in September 2007 by removing RRs on banks’ long-term external liabilities
to promote long-term, rather than short-term, capital inflows; five months later, it began a
series of RR hikes on other liabilities to strengthen the banking sector. When the GFC
unfolded, the central bank reversed RR hikes to release banks’ liquidity. Several central
banks also used RRs during the GFC to redistribute liquidity in the banking system. For
example, Brazil’s central bank observed that the GFC did not cause deposits to leave Brazil
systematically—rather, the crisis concentrated deposits among a few large institutions that
depositors considered relatively safe. Through RR adjustments, the central bank attempted
to reverse this accumulation of deposits among the largest banks of Brazil.
Authorities can use RR adjustments as an expression of government policy support for
certain types of companies or industries, both in normal times and when specific sectors are
under unique stress. For example, China adopted two-tier RRs with higher ratios applied to
the largest commercial banks and lower ratios to smaller commercial banks and urban and
rural credit cooperatives. The central bank initially tested the two-tier RRs in response to a
series of natural disasters in 2008. During the GFC, the central bank explained that the tiered
RR structure was part of a broader principle of “differentiated treatment to different
sectors,” which included credit allocation to the agricultural sector (PBOC 2009, 51).
During the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of the late 1990s, the Bank of Thailand repeatedly
expanded the list of reserve assets that healthy banks could use to satisfy the RR to meet
several policy purposes. Early on, it encouraged healthy banks to support illiquid banks by
allowing them to count their loans to a government liquidity fund as reserve assets. Later, it
adjusted its definition of eligible reserve assets for broader policy purposes beyond liquidity
provision—to encourage banks to provide funding to restructured banks and to government
agencies and state enterprises, which ultimately included the Export-Import Bank of
Thailand. Although this form of intervention has some risk attached, we believe it is an
interesting strategy to be considered in cases when the central bank is constrained in direct
liquidity provision.
In the early stages of the GFC, investors sold Jamaican-dollar assets in favor of foreign
currency assets seen as safe stores of value amid uncertainty and following the downgrades
of Jamaican national debt by the three major rating agencies. The sales of Jamaican-dollar
assets created “extraordinary foreign exchange needs” for Jamaican financial and
nonfinancial businesses (BOJ 2008). Around the same time, the maturation of Bank of
Jamaica (BOJ) and Government of Jamaica securities yielded further Jamaican-dollar
liquidity to bondholders. The BOJ sought to discourage those bondholders from swapping
Jamaican dollars for foreign currencies, which would have put further pressure on the value
of the Jamaican dollar. To do so, the BOJ raised reserve requirements for banks’ holdings of
Jamaican-dollar assets on three occasions.
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2. Part of a Package: Did the central bank have lender-of-last-resort authority to
back up liquidity provision through RR adjustments? Did any other interventions
accompany the RR adjustments?
Banks may be more willing to use built-up liquidity buffers, such as reserves, if the central
bank provides liquidity backstops at the same time (BIS 2012). Many jurisdictions in our
survey directly injected liquidity when lowering RRs. For example, Peru expanded its
repurchase agreement (repo) operations, introduced a new swap facility, and repurchased
certificates of deposit (CDs) from banks. During the GFC, Russia also provided emergency
lending, but this initiative required additional legislation by the parliament, thus taking
longer to launch than the RR adjustments.
In 1998, Russia reduced individual banks’ RRs on a case-by-case basis to facilitate three
multilateral clearing operations that reduced banks’ interbank liabilities. The central bank
had information on each bank’s outstanding liabilities to clients, other banks, and the
government. With this information, over a weekend, the central bank provided participants
with an overnight loan to settle end-of-day balances. If a bank still needed funds to settle, it
could draw down the reserves it held at the central bank. The central bank did not make
foreign currency available to banks while the multilateral clearing operations took place, to
prevent banks from immediately selling the additional ruble funds they received for settling
balances on the foreign exchange market.
In some cases, jurisdictions imposed relatively high RRs to make up for a relatively weak
lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) authority. Also, central banks with limited ability to act as LOLR
or offer deposit insurance used RR adjustments as their main tool to provide liquidity in
crisis times. For example, heading into the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994–1995, Argentina’s
central bank had limited LOLR capacity—up to 20% of the monetary base, which the central
bank nearly exceeded during the crisis—and did not have deposit insurance; that facility was
introduced only later into the crisis. Therefore, authorities relied on RR adjustments to
release liquidity quickly.
In Brazil, RR policy was the central bank’s main tool for providing liquidity at the onset of
the GFC. Legislation prohibited the central bank from using public money to rescue financial
institutions unless it was extending discount window loans with maturities of less than 360
days. Regardless, central bank officials said political pressure and scrutiny from the National
Congress and the public had discouraged the use of LOLR policy. The central bank was not
formally an independent institution, and central bank officials were liable for their actions
for up to five years after leaving office—a threat of legal action the officials took seriously
due to precedents. This structure greatly constrains an effective crisis response.
3. Legal Authority: Which body had the legal authority to adjust RRs?
Generally, central banks had discretion in their enabling legislation to adjust RR policy.
However, a small number of central banks required the government’s approval.
In China, the central bank required the State Council’s approval to adjust RRs. However, some
sources suggest that the approval process was not as rigorous for RR operations as for other
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monetary policy decisions under the central bank’s authority. Malaysia’s government also
required the central bank to obtain the finance minister’s approval before raising RRs.
Occasionally, laws constrained central banks’ ability to adjust RR policy by limiting how
much they could adjust the RR at one time. For example, in Jamaica, the central bank could
adjust a RR only once a month and by no more than 200 basis points (bps); as a result, the
central bank needed three months to raise RRs by 500 bps in 2008–2009. Russia’s central
bank could not change a RR more than 500 bps at a time.
4. Administration: What was the process for adjusting RRs?
Generally, central banks followed independent internal processes in deciding whether to
alter RRs. A minority of countries’ central banks needed to coordinate with other
government entities. For example, China’s central bank administered RR policy under the
guidance of the State Council. Malaysia’s central bank administered changes to the RR with
approval from the finance minister. The finance minister had authority to issue binding
directives against the central bank’s proposed actions, and if the central bank objected to the
finance minister’s override, the House of Representatives heard both sides’ reasoning. It
remains unclear who made the final decision.
In Brazil, the National Monetary Council set RR policy. Its members consisted of the minister
of state for finance; minister of state for planning, budget, and management; and the
president of the central bank. However, the central bank president was the main driver of
RR decisions.
In some cases, regulated financial entities were involved in setting RR policies. For example,
in Russia, the central bank’s board of directors administered RRs in coordination with the
central bank branches and with some participation from the Association of Russian Banks,
an interest group of Russian commercial banks. Certainly, any input from regulated
institutions must be treated with caution.
5. Governance: Did the body responsible for adjusting RRs have any legal mandate
on reporting, or did it receive any oversight on the process of adjusting RRs?
Most central banks were not subject to mandated reporting obligations or oversight for RR
adjustments. Regardless, some central banks incorporated accountability into their
practices. For example, although the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, did not formally
prescribe oversight or accountability policies, the central bank employed various practices
to ensure its policymaking was transparent. This approach included publicizing its policy
rationale and potential or expected outcomes. The governor of the central bank also held a
quarterly press conference after every policy review.
A minority of central banks were obligated to report to their legislatures about their RR
operations. In Argentina, the central bank reported annually on its operations to the
Congress. In China, the central bank submitted reports on monetary policy operations to the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and recorded its monetary policy
decisions and procedures for the State Council.
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6. Communication: How was the adjustment of RRs announced to the market or
public?
The central banks in the cases surveyed were clear in communicating that they intended RR
adjustments to deal with sudden stress in the financial system from the onset of a financial
crisis. Some—Argentina, India, Malaysia, and Russia—emphasized the temporary nature of
such policy changes at the announcement of the RR adjustment.
7. Assets Qualifying as Reserves: What types of assets satisfied RRs?
Reservable assets generally consisted of cash in local or foreign currency and sometimes
included treasuries or other assets like cash. The relative proportions of cash held at the
bank, cash and securities held at the central bank, and other reservable assets at the bank
are important to consider when evaluating the impact of RR adjustments. The proportions
differed in each jurisdiction. Some countries—China, Czech Republic, Malaysia, Venezuela—
required all RR funds to be held with the central bank. Some—Peru, Thailand—required
financial institutions to hold a specific portion of their required reserves with the central
bank and allowed them to hold the remainder in various acceptable reserve assets. Others—
Argentina, India, Jamaica—employed an additional liquidity requirement that essentially
functioned in the same way.
Sometimes, central banks expanded the assets that qualified as reserves when adjusting RR.
For example, India allowed banks to count as reserve assets their holdings of assets funded
with the government’s Liquidity Adjustment Facility.
Early in the AFC, the central bank of Thailand encouraged healthy banks to support illiquid
banks by allowing them to count their loans to a government liquidity fund as reserve assets.
As the crisis deepened, a newly created state-owned bank and new financial company
absorbed the failed banks and financial companies. After this consolidation, the central bank
expanded assets satisfying the RR to include the debt of these new entities. After the crisis,
it also added the Export-Import Bank of Thailand to the list to promote the export sector.
8. Reservable Liabilities: Against which liabilities could financial institutions hold
the liquid assets under RRs?
In calculating RRs, often liabilities included or excluded from the calculation were explicitly
listed in the relevant regulations. Generally, the reservable liabilities consisted of time,
savings, and checking deposits. They often excluded subordinated debt. Shareholder capital
is not a liability, by definition, but several central banks, to avoid confusion, explicitly noted
that banks were not required to hold reserves against it.
India, Thailand, and Venezuela required banks to hold reserves against various types of
nondeposit liabilities. India included external debts. Thailand included short-term foreign
liabilities and other borrowings with index-linked returns or embedded financial
derivatives. Venezuela included debts to export finance companies and public housing funds.
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During a crisis, central banks could change the reservable liabilities composition to motivate
lending to a certain sector. For example, China’s central bank differentiated RRs by business
type or lending portfolio; it applied lower RRs to agricultural banks and required banks to
have a certain portion of agricultural loans in their portfolios to qualify for lower RRs.
The composition of reservable liabilities may affect the behavior of banks in normal times
and sometimes affect the ability of RR adjustments to provide liquidity during crisis times.
For example, in Brazil, time deposits have been the most important source of domestic
funding for Brazilian banks since the 1990s, partly because the central bank has applied high
rates to demand and savings deposits.
In Argentina, a similar kind of migration to funding with a lower or no RR during normal
times affected the ability of the central bank to use an RR adjustment to provide appropriate
liquidity during crisis times. The central bank relied on lowering the RR as the main tool to
provide emergency liquidity. However, the RR applied to time deposits was much lower than
the RR applied to checking and overnight savings accounts in normal times; this disparity
created an unequal distribution of liquidity. When the crisis hit, time deposits showed a
higher propensity for runs. The central bank concluded that the unequal imposition of RRs
in normal times had parked liquidity in the wrong place. Also, the interbank market proved
to be a poor channel for transmission of liquidity across institutions in a systemic crisis
because time deposits were held mostly by investment banks.
If a central bank plans to rely on RR adjustments as a major tool for providing emergency
liquidity, it should ensure that the RR framework accurately reflects the potential risks in the
financial system to build up funds where they will be most needed, and unequal imposition
of RRs does not create a migration of funding to riskier sources.
9. Computation: What elements went into calculating RRs?
Central banks expressed ordinary RRs as the ratio of required reserve assets to a bank’s
reservable liabilities. As Figure 2 shows, jurisdictions differed in how they calculated the RR
(Della Valle, King, and Veyrune 2022). Some elements considered included:
(i) How long the maintenance period should be. The maintenance period is the length
of time during which financial institutions must maintain the specified level of
required reserve funds.
(ii) Whether to require financial institutions to meet the RR on a specific date or on
average over the maintenance period. Averaging gives financial institutions the
flexibility to allow their reserves to sometimes fall below the requirement during
the maintenance period.
(iii) Whether to calculate the reserve requirement based on financial institutions’
liabilities over the same time as the maintenance period (contemporaneous
accounting) or over an earlier period (lagged accounting). With lagged reserve
accounting, financial institutions can be certain about their required reserves; in a
contemporaneous framework, they may have an incentive to set aside more
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reserves than necessary to make sure they don’t fall below their requirements.
(Montoro and Moreno 2011, 56)
Figure 2: RR Computation Pre-crisis
Case

Averaging

Maintenance period

Lagged

Argentina 1994–1995

Yes

1 month

No

Brazil GFC

Yes

1–2 weeks
(depended on
deposit type)

Yes

China GFC

No

10 days

Yes

China 2015–2016

Yes(a)

10 days

Yes

Colombia GFC

Yes

2 weeks

Yes

Czech Republic 1997

Yes

2 weeks

N/A(b)

India GFC

Yes

2 weeks

N/A

Likely lagged, but unclear

Jamaica GFC

Yes

1 month

N/A

Likely lagged, but unclear

Malaysia AFC

Yes

2 weeks

N/A

Peru GFC

Yes

1 month

No

Russia 1998

Yes

25 days

Yes

Between the 5th and 30th day
of the month
Central bank could require
banks to compute RR ratios
before the official reporting
deadline

Russia GFC

Yes

1 month

No

Thailand AFC

Yes

1–2 weeks
(depended on
institution type)

No

Venezuela GFC

N/A

N/A

N/A

Notes

Half-lagged to lagged
measure; also depended on
deposit type

(a) In September 2015, the central bank changed from a time-point framework to an averaging method.
(b) N/A = not available.
Source: Authors’ analysis.

In response to a crisis, authorities can provide liquidity not only by changing the RR itself
but also by adjusting a certain part of the ratio calculation. For example, in Malaysia during
the AFC, the central bank gave banking institutions more flexibility in their daily liquidity
operations by widening the band for the permissible daily variation in the average balances
required to meet the RR. During the GFC, Russia raised and expanded its averaging ratio,6
Banks kept most required reserve funds in idle accounts with the central bank, which allowed banks that met
certain prudential criteria to meet a maximum percentage (the averaging ratio) of their RR ratios using the
monthly average balance of their correspondent accounts with the central bank. Correspondent accounts were
liquid accounts at a local central bank branch that banks used for interbank payments.
6
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which gave eligible banks access to some of their otherwise idle required reserve funds as a
source of additional liquidity.
Central banks also could set marginal reserve requirements. In these cases, the RR ratio
denominator was the change in a bank’s liabilities over a set time or above a threshold level
of liabilities. For example, Colombia in 2007 introduced a marginal RR on deposit liabilities
above the level of May 7, 2007, to lean against credit growth then eliminated this marginal
RR in the second half of August 2008 at the onset of the GFC. Similarly, Peru introduced a
marginal RR to temper short-term capital inflows and reinforce the banking sector for
increases in domestic currency–denominated liabilities but eliminated this marginal RR
during the GFC. Venezuela also cut its marginal RR during the GFC to increase bank liquidity.
10. Eligible Institutions: Which financial institutions were subject to RRs and RR
adjustments?
All central banks’ RRs applied to commercial banks and other depository institutions. Other
financial institutions could also be obligated to satisfy RRs. Venezuela required money
market mutual funds to hold reserves with the central bank. Peru applied its RRs to a wide
category of financial institutions, including municipal funds and small and microenterprise
development entities.
Argentina included investment banks and mortgage banks. However, attempts to use RR cuts
to promote liquidity during a crisis revealed some shortcomings of the RR framework.
Lowering RRs did little to resolve liquidity problems because the institutions experiencing
runs were investment banks offering time deposits. Although the liabilities of investment
banks were included in the RR framework, these bore low or no RRs. The central bank then
had to increase RRs on banks in the middle of a crisis to raise funds to lend to the troubled
investment banks.
Among the financial institutions required to hold reserves, those with a greater need for
liquidity often saw deeper central banks cuts to the RR. For example, in 2015–2016 the
Chinese central bank reduced RRs for all deposit-taking institutions but applied a lower RR
to small and rural institutions, as they had a greater need for liquidity, among other reasons.
During a later period of RR easing, China again cut RRs for all banks, but the Agricultural
Bank of China received a greater reduction to its RR.
In some instances, the central banks differentiated RRs on an individual-institution basis.
During the Ruble Crisis, Russia applied a specific RR for each bank while performing
multilateral clearing operations. The multilateral clearing operations are discussed in more
detail in Key Design Decision No. 2, Part of a Package.
11. Timing: As the crisis hit, when did the authorities use RR adjustments?
RR adjustment is often the first measure a country takes in response to a potential financial
crisis, a run, or other stress in the banking system. For example, Argentina during the
Mexican Peso Crisis quickly acted to adjust RRs when its peso devalued sharply in December
1994. During the GFC, Russia, China, Brazil, and Colombia adjusted their RRs in the same
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month or right before Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. RR adjustments in Peru, India,
Thailand, and Venezuela came slightly later—however, when their central banks felt the
repercussions of the GFC hit their jurisdictions, they soon reduced their RRs. Colombia had
a two-month gap between the announcement of the RR adjustments and the date they took
effect. In Jamaica, where the central bank faced limits on the size of monthly RR changes, the
central bank had to adjust the RR over three months to reach its targeted ratio.
Malaysia did not cut the RR until the second phase of its crisis. In its initial response, the
central bank cut the policy rate and the government attempted, without success, to borrow
on international capital markets. Only later, during a period of tightened fiscal and monetary
policy to contain inflationary pressures, did the central bank, having noticed disruption to
corporate borrowers’ access to credit, lower RRs to encourage financial institutions to
finance productive economic activity.
12. Changes in Reserve Requirements: What elements in the RRs changed?
Figure 3 lists the RR adjustments in the surveyed cases. Some countries differentiated RR
adjustments among currency, maturity, and types of liabilities. Further discussion on the
denominator of RR ratio calculation may be found in Key Design Decision No. 8, Reservable
Liabilities. Argentina, instead of cutting the RR, lowered its minimum cash requirement for
the RR, to release liquidity. In Venezuela, the central bank cut only the marginal RR.
Figure 3 also shows the amount of liquidity released based on data the central bank or
International Monetary Fund supplied. In some cases, a proxy for banking sector liquidity is
used; for example, China in 2015–2016 released a figure for the actual decline in bank
reserves after the RR cut. The actual impact of the liquidity, however, depends on other
factors including conditions around reservable assets and remuneration on those assets held
at the central bank, and therefore does not directly translate into the amount of liquidity
banks made available to the market or themselves through the RR adjustments. For example,
during the GFC, various industry officials in the country stated that the Reserve Bank of
India’s policy rate cuts, including the reduction to the RR, had not led to adequate credit
expansion, and the then–commerce and industry minister remarked that fresh liquidity
released had not reached “cash-starved industry and consumers” (Dhasmana 2009).

144

Reserve Requirements

Rhee et al.

Figure 3: RR Changes and Liquidity Released
Liquidity released
(USD)

Case

RR range

Eligible Liabilities

Argentina
1994–1995(a)

43%–30%
3%–1%

demand and savings deposits
time deposits

Brazil GFC

53%–42%
30%–20%
8%–9%

demand deposits
savings deposits
time deposits

China GFC

17.5%–15.5%

headline rate for large financial institutions

117 billion__

China 2015–2016

20%–17.5%

headline rate for large financial institutions

330 billion(b)

Colombia GFC

40%–11%
35%–11%
7.5%–4.5%

checking accounts
savings accounts
time deposits

Czech Republic 1997

11.5%–9.5%

all

0.66 billion(c)

India GFC

9%–5%
25%–24%

cash reserve requirement
statutory liquidity ratio

40.9 billion__

Jamaica GFC

9%–14%
23%–28%

cash
liquid assets

Malaysia AFC

13.5%–4%

all

Peru GFC

9%–6%
40%–0%

ordinary RR
marginal RR

Russia 1998

16%–5%
13%–5%
10%–5%

demand and time liabilities up to 30 days
time liabilities of 31–90 days
time liabilities of more than 90 days

Russia GFC

8.5%–0.5%
6.5%–0.5%
5.5%–0.5%

liabilities to foreign banks
other liabilities
liabilities to individuals in rubles

14.1 billion__

Thailand AFC

7%–6%

all

1.52 billion__

Venezuela GFC

30%–17%

marginal RR

4 billion__
71 billion__

—

(0.17 billion)(d)
9.7 billion(e)
0.75 billion__
2.8 billion(b)

2.8 billion__

(a) These changes apply to the minimum cash requirement within the RR. The authorities announced that
these resulted in an indirect average RR cut of 21% to 14% for all deposits.
(b) These figures are not specifically liquidity released but a decline in bank reserves (China 2015–2016) and
a decline in required reserve account balances (Russia 1998), representing the amount actually drawn
down through the cuts to RRs.
(c) This figure reflects the May 1997 cut only; the central bank cut the reserve requirement ratio three more
times during July 1998–October 1999. About half of this figure was sterilized through requiring importers
to deposit a certain percentage of the value of their imports with the central bank.
(d) Jamaica increased the RR to prevent its currency from sharply depreciating; the figure presented
represents liquidity absorbed. This is the only case in the survey covering a country that increased the RR.
(e) Out of USD 9.7 billion, the first RR adjustment released USD 5.8 billion, which was sterilized, and the later
adjustment released USD 3.9 billion, which was not sterilized.
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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13. Changes in Interest/Remuneration: Were changes made to remuneration on
assets held in an account with the central bank as required reserves?
Among the cases reviewed, five central banks had the authority to pay interest on the portion
of reserves held at the central bank—Brazil, China, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. However,
although Peru and Venezuela had the authority to remunerate, they did not do so. Colombia
ultimately stopped remunerating reserves on July 24, 2009. Argentina amended the relevant
law in 2001, after the crisis, allowing the central bank to remunerate reserves. Of course, as
noted, several central banks allowed financial institutions to hold reserve assets other than
cash or deposits with the central bank, such as government securities, that typically paid
interest.
Brazil’s RRs included ordinary reserves, which paid low or no interest; extraordinary reserves,
which the Banco Central do Brasil required banks to hold in cash; and a government bond–
holding requirement. Both the extraordinary cash reserves and the government bonds earned
interest at the central bank’s target policy rate. During the GFC, Brazil also introduced a
temporary RR that forced banks to move their time deposit reserves from government bonds
to unremunerated reserves unless they provided liquidity to smaller banks.
14. Other Restrictions: Did any other conditions or restrictions accompany the
adjustments to RRs?
Sometimes, central banks attached additional conditions to direct liquidity released by
adjustments to RRs to a specific use by the banks and financial institutions. In Russia in 1998,
the central bank allowed the banks to use funds in the reserves to settle and clear interbank
liabilities.
In Brazil, the central bank’s RR policy had an unusual component that we didn’t see in other
cases: it allowed banks to deduct part of their required reserves by fixed amounts, varying
for the three types of RRs. The deductibles effectively lowered the RR burden for relatively
small banks. In particular, the government bond–holding RR had a high deductible that
effectively exempted most small and medium-sized banks. In addition, during the GFC, the
central bank allowed the largest six banks to deduct loan portfolio purchases from the
remaining 97 banks from their government bond–holding RR. With this deduction, the
central bank attempted to voluntarily shift reserves from large banks to smaller banks.
Argentina, India, Peru, and Russia imposed fines on banks that fell short of the RR. In Russia,
the central bank waived the fine for noncompliance during the period of RR adjustment.
15. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: Did the release of liquidity through an
adjustment to the RR have any impact on monetary or macroprudential policies,
or did the authorities implement sterilizing measures for the additional liquidity
released?
Generally, there was no sterilization for the additional liquidity provided by lowering RRs.
However, the Czech Republic and Malaysia did attempt to sterilize. The Czech Republic
partially sterilized the additional liquidity through the government’s new import deposit
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scheme, in which importers of select goods had to deposit 20% of their imports’ value with
the central bank for a six-month period. The central bank also sterilized a lowering of RRs
through repo transactions.
The Malaysian central bank initially sterilized additional liquidity by reducing direct lending
to the interbank market. However, its later lowering of the RR remained unsterilized as the
central bank determined that its overall policy package had successfully reduced inflation.
16. Duration: Did the authorities announce an end date for the RR adjustment?
Most of the central banks in the cases surveyed did not announce an end date, although many
emphasized the temporary nature of the RR adjustments. A Bank for International
Settlements report suggests that banks and other financial institutions will be more willing
to use the released liquidity if the authority can credibly convince the market that it is
committed to keeping reserve requirements low until banks have sufficient time to rebuild
buffers (BIS 2012).
In both the Ruble Crisis and the GFC, Russia explicitly stated an end date. As each crisis
persisted, the central bank ultimately postponed the date at which it would return RRs to
pre-crisis levels. In Argentina, the initial announcement of the RR adjustment did not include
a specific end date, but the central bank did announce one a few weeks later.

Conclusion
The literature assessing the effectiveness of RR adjustments in response to financial crises is
limited. Often, the RR adjustments were accompanied by other liquidity providing
interventions; thus, isolating the effect of the adjustments in providing liquidity relief to
financial institutions is difficult. Many central banks published the amount of liquidity they
expected to release through RR adjustments. However, a bank or financial institution did not
necessarily use the released funds to deal with liquidity shortages within the institution or
extend loans.
Nevertheless, we find that a close examination of 14 cases suggests that RR adjustments have
several advantages in a crisis: (1) they require little process, and the change for banks can
be quick; (2) stigma concerns may be much lower than with emergency lending operations;
(3) RRs can be used to fine-tune incentives for holding various types and maturities of assets;
and (4) RR easing can complement a central bank’s other liquidity support programs.
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